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Abstract
We analyze a proprietary dataset of trades by a single asset manager, comparing their
price impact with that of the trades of the rest of the market. In the context of a linear
propagator model we find no significant difference between the two, suggesting that both
the magnitude and time dependence of impact are universal in anonymous, electronic
markets. This result is important as optimal execution policies often rely on propagators
calibrated on anonymous data. We also find evidence that in the wake of a trade the
order flow of other market participants first adds further copy-cat trades enhancing price
impact on very short time scales. The induced order flow then quickly inverts, thereby
contributing to impact decay.
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1 Introduction
Trading impacts prices – this is an undisputable empirical statement. However, the interpre-
tation of this observed impact is still debated. Is it observed because trades forecast future
price changes that would have happened anyway, as Efficient Market theorists would argue?
Or should one better think of markets as a kind of physical medium that reacts statistically
similarly to all trades, whether informed or not?
This question is key to assess the relevance of most empirical studies of impact, that are
based on anonymized order flow, where all orders are de facto treated on an equal footing.
The average impact extracted from these studies could be misleading if “informed” and “unin-
formed” trades have completely different impacts. This is especially relevant in the context of
popular models of impact, such as Hasbrouck’s VAR model (Hasbrouck, 1991, 2007) and the
“propagator” model (Bouchaud et al., 2004), where the average reaction to market orders is
deduced from a joint analysis of the order flow and the price time series (see also (Eisler et al.,
2013; Patzelt and Bouchaud, 2017; Taranto et al., 2016) for more recent developments). The
standard practice is indeed to calibrate such models using public time series with anonymous
orders, and deduce the average lag-dependent impact (or propagator) of market orders, with
the hope of using this information to anticipate one’s own market impact in future trading, and
of timing executions accordingly (Gatheral et al., 2012).
In this study – to our knowledge the first of its kind – we aim to address this question by
comparing the impact of the trades of Capital Fund Management (CFM) based on a proprietary
dataset with the impact of the rest of the market. Perhaps surprisingly, we find no significant
difference between the two. Our results strongly support the “physical medium” picture of
markets, that statistically reacts to all perturbations in a similar way. Interestingly, we find
that the reaction is first of a “copy-cat” type, where the initial trade is imitated by other market
participants on very short time scales, while on longer time scales liquidity refill and/or trades
in the opposite direction lead to impact reversion. On much longer time scales, the information
motivating the trade (if any) is progressively revealed.
2 Data and notations
In the following we will analyze data on 98 liquid US stocks in the period 2 January 2014–31
December 2015. This includes all trades executed in the major lit markets. Each trade will
be classified via a tag variable θ. Trades by the strategies managed by CFM will be denoted
as θ = CFM, whereas those by all other market participants – which we will consider as a
single representative actor – as θ = mkt. We will work in trade time, meaning that the time
step counter t is incremented whenever a trade occurs on the stock being studied. All trades
on the same stock, reported in the same millisecond, at the same price, in the same direction
and bearing the same participant tag are aggregated into one single transaction, because these
usually correspond to the same single market order. After aggregation our dataset includes
close to 520M trades, of which approx. 0.6% belong to CFM.
We will denote by t the side of the market order at time t, t = +1 for buyer initiated, and
−1 for seller initiated ones. mt will be the mid price just before the trade t. We will use the
indicator function I(A) defined as I(A) = 1 if A is true and I(A) = 0 otherwise. For example,
the expression I(θt = θ) is 1 if the trade at time t resulted from a market order by θ. The
unconditional probability of the type θ is thus by definition P (θ) = 〈I(θt = θ)〉. Finally, as
discussed in Ref. (Eisler et al., 2013), for any quantity X its average sampled at trades initiated
by an actor of type θ is
〈X|θt = θ〉 = 〈XI(θt = θ)〉
P (θ)
. (1)
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Figure 1: The price response Rθ for θ = mkt (black) and θ = CFM (red), averaged over all stocks in our pool.
RCFM is stronger than Rmkt for very short times, but RCFM reverts for 10 < τ < 100 and trends afterwards.
The green line corresponds to the reconstructed response function, assuming that the single trade impact is the
same for CFM and for the rest of the market, and accounting for a progressive revelation of the information
content of the CFM trades. The final dip in the reconstructed response is a numerical artefact.
3 Price impact and order flow with labeled data
Let us define the response function of trades (Bouchaud et al., 2004; To´th et al., 2012) initiated
by actor θ as the average subsequent change of the mid price in the direction of the trade:
Rθ(τ) =
〈(mt+τ −mt)I(θt = θ)t〉
P (θ)
. (2)
The average of this quantity across all stocks in our dataset is shown in Fig. 1. The overall
shape of Rmkt(τ) is compatible with that previously reported in the literature. On the other
hand, RCFM(τ) is clearly different, with a hump for short times, and then a continuous upward
trend. We will discuss the possible origin of these differences in the following.
It is convenient to define the correlation function of the market order flow corresponding to
two tags θ and θ′ as
Cθ,θ′(τ > 0) =
〈I(θt = θ)tI(θt+τ = θ′)t+τ 〉
P (θ)P (θ′)
, (3)
where conventionally θ is the first to trade. Considering that both θ and θ′ can be CFM or mkt,
there are four possible combinations, that are shown in Fig. 2. The market-market order flow
autocorrelation Cmkt,mkt(τ) is well known to be positive and slowly decaying, as a consequence
of order splitting (Lillo et al., 2004; To´th et al., 2015). Since liquidity at the best bid and ask
in order books is typically small, market participants slice their full quantity they intend to
trade into correspondingly small orders. This results in the observed persistency of order flow
revealed by Cmkt,mkt. CCFM,CFM is qualitatively similar to Cmkt,mkt, decaying slowly.
The correlation CCFM,mkt(τ), on the other hand, measures how the market “reacts” to CFM’s
trades. For short time lags we observe a strong positive correlation, i.e. other actors herd on
CFM’s trade. This correlation then quickly reverts on the scale of ∼ 10 trades and becomes
negative for longer time lags, indicating a contrarian behaviour of the rest of the market –
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Figure 2: The correlation functions, Cθ,θ′ , for θ
′ = mkt and θ = mkt (black), θ′ = mkt and θ = CFM (green),
θ′ = CFM and θ = mkt (blue), θ′ = CFM and θ = CFM (red), averaged over all stocks in our pool. Note, that
the vertical axis is logarithmic both in the positive and negative planes. We see that while Cmkt,mkt decays
slowly and remains positive up to very long times, CCFM,mkt becomes rapidly negative after the initial positive
part, and remains weakly negative afterwards.
in other words, a flow of buy orders generates a counter-flow of sell orders, as discussed in
many papers (see e.g. (Bouchaud et al., 2006; Eisler et al., 2013; To´th et al., 2012; Weber and
Rosenow, 2005)). We also show the correlation Cmkt,CFM(τ), measuring how CFM reacts to the
order flow of the market. This correlation is two orders of magnitude weaker than the others.
In order to more precisely quantify the causal relationship between individual orders and
subsequent price changes, it is customary (Bouchaud et al., 2004; Eisler et al., 2013) to assume
that the price response to market orders can be described by linear kernels Gθ, i.e.:
mt = m−∞ +
∑
θ
∑
t′<t
Gθ(t− t′)I(θt′ = θ)t′ +
∑
t′<t
ζt, (4)
where ζt is a zero mean, i.i.d. noise term. In this equation the propagator Gθ(t− t′) represents
the evolution of the mid price from t′ to t given that the actor θ executed an isolated buy order
in t′. The model can be calibrated using the following relation between R, C and G (Eisler
et al., 2013):
Rθ(τ + 1)− Rθ(τ) =
∑
θ′
P (θ′)
[
Gθ′(0)Cθ,θ′(τ) +
∑
n>−τ
[Gθ′(τ + n+ 1)−Gθ′(τ + n)]Cθ,θ′(n)
]
. (5)
We have injected the average Rθ’s and Cθ,θ′ ’s plotted in Figs. 1 and 2, for 1 6 τ 6 1000, to
obtain the propagators Gmkt(τ) and GCFM(τ). We show the results in Fig. 3, together with
error bars that are estimated by bootstrapping over the pool of stocks. We claim that apart
from very short time scales, no significant difference between the effect of CFM’s trades and
those of the rest of the market. For short time scales, we attribute the remaining discrepancies
to the fact that CFM volumes being on average larger than the rest of the market, while in
our model all trades, independently of their volume, are assumed to impact the market in
the same way. At large lags, there are systematic biases in the estimates of the G’s coming
from boundary effects (i.e., implicitly setting Gθ(τ) = cst. for τ > 1000), so that the results
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Figure 3: The propagators, Gθ, for θ = mkt (black) and θ = CFM (red). Error bars are estimated by
bootstrapping over the pool of stocks. Apart from the difference for very short times, the two curves are very
similar. The data for τ & 500 is affected both by the (numerical) boundary conditions at τ = 1000, and by the
progressive revelation of the information content of CFM’s trades.
cannot be trusted in that region. Furthermore, the information content of trades is expected
to progressively show up.
In order to bolster our claim that Gmkt(τ) ≈ GCFM(τ), we have computed the reconstructed
response function to CFM’s trades, using Eq. (5) with GCFM(τ) = Gmkt(τ), and adding an
information revelation contribution proportional to τ itself, leaving the slope as an extra fitting
parameter. As can be seen in Fig. 1, the reconstructed response function reproduces very well
all the different features of RCFM(τ). Therefore, the difference between the response functions
reported in Fig. 1 can chiefly be attributed to different cross-correlations between order flows
and information revelation, but does not come from the “bare” reaction of the market encoded
in the propagators. This is the central message of our paper.
Let us stress that the curves in Fig. 3 represent an average over all 98 stocks in our sample, so
one could wonder whether the agreement reported here still holds for each individual stock. The
results are obviously much more noisy for the individual stocks separately, but the conclusion
is the same, i.e. there is no systematic difference between the time dependence of the market
propagator Gmkt(τ) and the CFM propagator GCFM(τ). The global scale of these propagators
can, however, be different for certain stocks. This is related to the fact that the average size of
CFM’s individual trades can be different from that of the rest of the market.
4 Cross-correlations and induced trades
In order to dwell further on the effects induced by order flow correlations, we deconvolute the
correlation functions Cθ,θ′ in terms of flow-reaction kernels Kθ,θ′ defined through the following
regression (Eisler et al., 2013):
I(θt = θ)t =
∑
θ′
∑
t′<t
Kθ′,θ(t− t′)I(θt′ = θ′)t′ + µt, (6)
where µt is again a zero mean, i.i.d. noise. Here Kθ′,θ(t−t′) is the expected order flow imbalance
(probability of buys minus probability of sells) of actor θ at time t conditional to actor θ′ sending
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Figure 4: The flow-reaction kernels Kθ,θ′ . Note that the vertical axis is logarithmic both in the positive and
negative planes. We find that KCFM,CFM (red) and Kmkt,mkt (black) are very similar. KCFM,mkt (green) is
positive for very short times and becomes persistently negative later. Kmkt,CFM (blue) is much weaker than the
other terms.
a buy order at an earlier time t′.
Similarly to correlation functions there are four such kernels, shown in Fig. 4. The self-
kernels Kmkt,mkt and KCFM,CFM are quite similar. From the literature and our own experience we
know that both curves are dominated by order splitting, common to most large investors (Lillo
et al., 2004; To´th et al., 2015). Note however, that Kmkt,mkt contains both a contribution from
order splitting and a contribution from reaction trades among other participants. The kernel
KCFM,mkt – describing purely how the market reacts to CFM’s trades – is quite interesting. Its
shape supports what was expected based on the sign correlation itself. Notably, on a short time
scale (in this case up to lag 2) trades by CFM induce copy-cat trades by the market. This effect
then reverts and gives way to a weaker, but much more persistent (up to at least 100 trades)
flow of contrarian orders by others. This direct observation of the interaction of aggressive
order flows from different actors is another noteworthy result of our study. It is also clearly
related to the previously documented passive limit order counter-flow (“liquidity refill”), which
manifests itself as the decay of the propagator G (Bouchaud et al., 2006; Eisler et al., 2013;
To´th et al., 2012).
5 The total impact of a single trade
By definition, the impact of an isolated trade, stripped off from its “cloud” of correlated trades,
is measured by the propagators Gmkt(τ), GCFM(τ). However, we now know that even if a given
market participant chooses to execute a single trade, it will be followed by other “reaction”
trades, with a probability encoded by the cross kernel K (Eisler et al., 2013). The total
unconditional impact, denoted G?CFM(τ), of a single market order sent by CFM is therefore
given by the sum of the single trade impact and the impact of the induced trades, namely,
G?CFM(τ) = GCFM(τ) +
∑
0<τ1<τ
KCFM,mkt(τ1)G
?
mkt(τ − τ1), (7)
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Figure 5: Comparison of Gmkt (black), G
?
mkt (red) and G
?
CFM (green). The total impact of a single trade is
enhanced at short times by copy-cat trades, but afterwards decays back close to the bare propagator G. G?CFM
is very similar to G?mkt in line with our assumption that CFM trades are not statistically different from those
of the market.
where G?mkt(τ) is the total market impact, itself dressed by its own reaction trades. The latter
can be represented as
G?mkt(τ) = Gmkt(τ)+
∑
0<τ1<τ
Kmkt,CFM(τ1)G
?
CFM(τ−τ1)+
∑
0<τ1<τ
Kmkt,mkt′(τ1)G
?
mkt(τ−τ1), (8)
where we introduced a new function: Kmkt,mkt′(τ) describes the reaction to an order by a given
market participant, by all other market participants excluding CFM. Exactly as the propagator
for CFM trades is nearly identical to that of any market trade, it is reasonable to assume that
in an anonymous market the same is true for the reaction of the order flow itself. In other
words, one expects that
Kmkt,mkt′(τ) ≈ KCFM,mkt(τ), (9)
possibly with an overall multiplicative factor that accounts for the difference in traded volumes.
Furthermore, from the blue curve in Fig. 4 we see that the reaction of CFM’s order flow to
market trades is negligible, i.e. Kmkt,CFM(τ) ≈ 0. This final observation along with Eq. (9)
allows us to simplify Eq. (8) to a closed, self-consistent equation for G?mkt(τ) in terms of
observable quantities:
G?mkt(τ) ≈ Gmkt(τ) +
∑
0<τ1<τ
KCFM,mkt(τ1)G
?
mkt(τ − τ1). (10)
This equation can be solved numerically, leading to the result plotted in Fig. 5. As expected
from the short-term herding effect unveiled in the previous section, we see that the total impact
of a single trade is enhanced at short times by copy-cat trades, but afterwards decays back close
to the bare propagator G. Comparing Eq. (10) with Eq. (7) furthermore yields G?CFM(τ) ≈
G?mkt(τ), as a direct consequence of our assumption that CFM trades are not statistically
different from those of the market.
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6 Conclusion
Based on our proprietary dataset, we have argued that there is no significant difference, at the
single trade level, between the short term price impact of CFM and that of the rest of the
market. This is a strong indication of the universality of impact across all market participants,
bolstering the idea that short term impact is a property of the market itself, and has no relation
whatsoever to the information content of trades that only reveals itself on longer time scales
(hundreds of trades in the present case). In an anonymous market we indeed expect the same
collective behavior to follow the actions of any market participant. Our findings empirically
support a “physical medium” theory of market impact, which is relevant in practice as optimal
execution policies often implicitly rely on such an assumption. The interaction of aggressive
order flow among actors contributes to price moves in a small, but significant way, and its
calibration on anonymous data is warranted by the present results.
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